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Umbilical Cords: The New Drug Connection
MARGARET PHILLIPS*
INTRODUCTION
A novel prosecutorial strategy is pitting women against their fetuses:
charging pregnant drug users with dealing drugs to their fetuses. Ac-
cording to the strategy used in Michigan, ' Florida,2 South Carolina,3
* J.D. Candidate, May, 1992, SUNY at Buffalo Law School. The author would like to thank
Tara Flynn and Donna Menghini for their superb editorial talents, as well as Professors Judy Scales-
Trent and Isabel Marcus for their inspiration, guidance and support. In addition, none of this work
would have been possible without the American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Rights Task
Force and Lynne Paltrow and their unfailing dedication to provide up-to-date information to the
public.
1. People v. Hardy, No. 89-2931-FY (60th Dist. Ct. Muskegon County, Mich. filed Dec. 5,
1989), rev'd, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (1991) (drug
delivery charge dismissed against Kimberly Hardy based on improper statutory construction); Peo-
ple v. Cox, No. 9053545FH (Cir. Ct. Jackson County, Mich. filed Jan. 30, 1990), discussed in, Case
Summary, infra note 2, at 9 (prosecutor arguing that drug delivery occurred during the seconds after
birth and before the umbilical cord was severed). The case was dismissed by a Jackson County judge
in July 1990. Linda Warren, Judge Orders Lawyers to Stand Trial in Cocaine-Baby Case, UPI, July
18, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; People v. Bremer, No. 90-3227-FH, slip op.
(60th Dist. Muskegon County, Mich. Jan. 31, 1991) (charges of drug delivery dismissed as a viola-
tion of due process and right to privacy).
2. As of April 1991, in Escambia, Florida, there were six such prosecutions pending against
women with one woman awaiting trial. Ginny Graybiel, Prosecuting Cocaine Mothers Frustrates
State, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Apr. 28, 1991, at IA, 10A (information derived from "Cocaine Baby
Cases" table). See also ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, State by State Case Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women and Appendix of Public Health and Public Interest
Groups Opposed to These Prosecutions (May 21, 1991) [hereinafter Case Summary]. Jennifer John-
son is currently awaiting a decision from the Florida Supreme Court on her appeal of drug distribu-
tion charges. Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'g No.89-01765 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1989), discussed in, Case Summary, supra, at 5-6. In State v. Carter, No. 90-
2261, slip op. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 23, 1990), discussed in, Case Summary, supra, at 4-5, Ethel
Carter was charged with making an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Although the
charges were dismissed, the State is appealing the dismissal. See also Graybiel, supra. In State v.
Black, No. 89-5325, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. Escambia County Jan. 3, 1990), discussed in, Case Sum-
mary, supra, at 4, a woman was convicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison and three years
probation for passing cocaine to her baby through the umbilical cord. Charges of drug delivery have
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Georgia,4 and Massachusetts,' the woman's cocaine or crack use in-
troduces the drug into the blood stream, and the drug is ultimately "de-
livered" to the fetus via the placenta or the umbilical cord.6 Prosecutors
have defined "delivery" to the fetus as drug delivery to a minor - con-
duct that is prohibited under criminal narcotics laws.7 This "delivery"
has become a new crime with which to threaten pregnant addicts, one
which infringes upon the constitutional rights of pregnant drug users,
and perpetuates discriminatory treatment against pregnant women.
The highest courts to rule on the validity of the drug delivery strat-
egy, the Florida and Michigan Courts of Appeals, have decided the issue
differently. The first woman to be convicted under a drug trafficking
statute for giving birth to an infant who tested positive for cocaine was
prosecuted in Florida.' The Florida courts, at both the trial and the ap-
pellate level, upheld Jennifer Johnson's prosecution under the drug deliv-
ery statute.9 The court reasoned that the application of the drug
trafficking statute to the passage of blood through an umbilical cord to a
been dismissed in State v. Hudson, No. K88-3435-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 26, 1989), discussed in,
Case Summary, supra, at 4, because Toni Hudson pled guilty to a charge of drug possession and the
drug distribution charges were dropped.
3. According to the Case Summary, supra note 2, at 12, ten women in Charleston, South Caro-
lina have been charged with criminal neglect or distribution.
4. In State v. Coney, No. 14/403-404 (Super. Ct. Crisp County, Ga. filed Nov. 6, 1989), dis-
cussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 6, defendant was indicted for distribution of cocaine to her
fetus because of her alleged drug use during pregnancy. The case is awaiting the outcome of a
Motion to Dismiss on defendant's behalf, as well as the possibility that the charges may be dropped.
Case Summary, supra note 2, at 6.
5. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 1990) discussed in,
Case Summary, supra note 2, at 9 (in dismissing the drug delivery charges against the defendant, this
court was the first to reach the constitutional issues implicated by the drug delivery strategy, such as
the right to privacy and due process).
6. See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
8. State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), aff'd, Johnson v.
State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 5-6.
9. Id. Jennifer Johnson was prosecuted under § 893.13(l)(c) of the FLA. PENAL CODE (1989),
which reads:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or
older to deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years, or to
use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an agent or employee in the sale or
delivery....
The Florida Court of Appeals, recognizing the issue of maternal substance abuse and the application
of drug delivery statutes to be of great importance, certified the following question to be resolved by
the Supreme Court of Florida: "Whether the ingestion of a controlled substance by a mother who
knows the substance will pass to her child after birth is a violation of Florida law?" Johnson, 578
So.2d 419.
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newborn was "logic[al]," I and implied that such an application was con-
sistent with the intent of the Florida legislature."1 Kimberly Hardy,
prosecuted in Michigan, had drug delivery charges against her dismissed
in a recent decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals.1 2 The court
based its decision upon the notion that statutes, especially criminal stat-
utes, should be strictly construed according to legislative intent, and that
interpreting the drug delivery statute as applicable to pregnant drug
users is not a "reasonable construction of the statute."
13
While the courts' opinions remained focused on the legal issue of
statutory construction, that is, whether the drug trafficking statute could
be applied to the birthing process, the implications of this drug delivery
strategy are far reaching. Prosecuting pregnant drug users under drug
delivery statutes both exposes and perpetuates gender inequality in the
legal treatment of pregnancy. By subjecting women to novel and unprec-
edented interpretations of criminal drug trafficking statutes, the state re-
inforces women's lower status in the political and social hierarchy. The
issue of maternal substance abuse has been attracting national attention14
and provoking much discussion among civil liberty organizations, femi-
nists and prosecutors15 because it challenges the definitions of gender
10. Johnson, 578 So.2d at 420. The court stated that "The question is whether the acts of
appellant violate the statute. Logic leads us to say that appellant violated the statute." Id.
11. Id. The only specific reference the court made to legislative intent was when they mentioned
their consideration of appellant's argument that the Florida legislature "declined to pass a child
abuse statute which forbade similar conduct." Id. Their consideration of appellant's argument, and
their decision that Jennifer Johnson violated the drug trafficking statute, indicates that the court did
not view Florida legislative intent as a bar to applying the drug trafficking statute to pregnant drug
users.
12. People -v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1991). Kimberly Hardy was charged under
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) (1990 & Supp. 1991-92) and MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv) (Callaghan 1990).
13. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52. A recent bill approved by the Michigan House of Representa-
tives aims to prevent prosecutors from filing felony charges against mothers who used drugs while
pregnant. See H.R. 5241, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1991).
14. See, eg., Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at
52; Michele Magar, The Sins ofthe Mothers, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991, at 30; Richard Lacayo, Do
the Unborn Have Rights?, TIME, Special Fall Issue, 1990, at 22; Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted -
and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 33; Mark Curriden, Holding Mom
Accountable, 76 A.B.A. J. 50 (1990); Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issues for the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14; Eileen McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the
Rise, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1989, at 1; No Indictment in Fetus Abuse Cocaine Case, L.A. TIMES,
May 27, 1989, § 1, at 23; Punishing Pregnant Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1989, § 4, at 5; Deborah Sharp, Drug-Baby Case Sentence Today; Ex-Addict Mother is First
Convicted, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1989, at A3; B.D. Colen, A Drug Case Pregnant with Problems,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1989, (Discovery Section), at 11.
15. The Reproductive Freedom Project of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has
1992]
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equality and the maternal-fetal relationship. Only women can have the
unique relationship of biological connection to the fetus, yet this connec-
tion has served to open the door to disproportionate punishment.
Although perhaps there exists a core of agreement that our society must
find a way to curb illegal behavior that endangers both mother and child,
little agreement exists as to how this should be accomplished.
This debate has largely centered on the issue of fetal rights versus
women's rights. 6 The law has historically recognized certain interests of
the fetus.7 Originally, however, these interests coincided with the inter-
written a memorandum, see Case Summary, supra note 2, along with an overview of the memo
assessing the disparate impact of criminal prosecutions against women of color, Memorandum from
Lynn Paltrow et al., Overview of ACLU National Survey of Criminal Prosecution Brought Against
Pregnant Women (Oct. 3, 1990) [hereinafter Overview]. The ACLU has also been active in repre-
senting the women being prosecuted, such as Kimberly Hardy in People v. Hardy, No. 89-293 I-FY
(60th Dist. Ct., Muskegon County, Mich. filed Dec. 5, 1989), rev'd, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991), and Jennifer Johnson in State v. Johnson, No.
E89-890-CFA, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 5-
6. Feminist commentators have decried prosecuting pregnant addicts when there is a shortage of
prenatal and rehabilitative care. See, eg., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Katha
Pollitt, A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1990, at 409; Lynn M. Paltrow, When
Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 41 (Winter/Spring 1990); Jacqueline Berrien,
Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 239 (1990); Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications
of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 277
(1987-88); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter, Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood]. In addition, the National
Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse (NCPCA), an affiliate of the National District Attorneys
Association (NDAA), published Volume 3, Number 8 of their Update newsletter entitled Pregnant
Addict" The Debate Over Prosecution. The NCPCA also sponsored a July 1990 national conference
entitled "Substance Abused Infants: A Prosecutorial Dilemma." See Substance Abused Infants: A
Prosecutorial Dilemma, NCPCA UPDATE (NDAA/Nat'I Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse,
Alexandria, Va.), Sept./Oct. 1990 [hereinafter NCPCA UPDATE].
16. See, eg., Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs The Case Against the Criminalization of
"FetalAbuse" 101 HIARv. L. REv. 994 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs]
(arguing that a woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity must be weighed against the state's
interest in enhancing the quality of an infant's life, and that a proper balance would preclude the
implementation of broad statutes criminalizing pregnant women's otherwise legal conduct); Janet
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. VOMEN'S
L.J. 9 (1987) (discussing the development of fetal rights and how fetal rights have contributed to the
legal construction of pregnant woman and fetus as adversaries).
17. See, eg., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW o TORTS § 55,
at n.6 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. Prosser states:
Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery, though it is
for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He may
take under the Statute of Distributions. He may take by devise. He may be entitled
under a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction, and he may have a
guardian.
UMBILICAL CORDS
ests of the pregnant women, such as freedom from injury or assault.'"
Gradually the recognition of the fetus grew into legal rights for the fetus,
which no longer depended on the mother for definition. 9 The perceived
separation between the mother and the fetus has also facilitated a percep-
tion of them as potential adversaries.20 Especially in cases of maternal
drug use, women have been subjected to civil and criminal charges in the
name of fetal rights. Prosecutors can then conveniently overlook preg-
nant women's rights to due process and privacy.2'
This Note argues that the unprecedented prosecutorial strategy of
using drug trafficking statutes to convict pregnant women is yet another
encroachment on the rights of women. The prosecutorial theory rests on
a distortion of the maternal-fetal relationship which views women as ene-
mies of their fetuses, and pregnancy as a means of harming the fetus.
Because the prosecutorial strategy focuses on the adversarial nature of
the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus, it requires an
illusion of separation between the two.22 The notion of the fetus as sepa-
rate from the pregnant woman has been facilitated by the emergence of
increased legal status for the fetus. Part I of this Note discusses how the
legal status of the fetus has developed in tort law, family law, and crimi-
nal law. By allowing the fetus increased protection and recognition, legal
standards have contributed to the conceptualization of the fetus as a sep-
arate entity, and have laid the foundation for the prosecutorial "delivery"
strategy. Part II discusses how application of drug trafficking statutes to
pregnant women depends on biased statutory construction, and shows
how the "delivery" strategy deprives pregnant drug users of their consti-
tutional rights of due process. The drug delivery strategy is both a prod-
uct and an illustration of biased definition and treatment of pregnancy.
Part III argues that a fundamental problem in reaching equality for wo-
men is the legal definition and treatment of pregnancy. Part III also ex-
plores the bias inherent in the definition of the maternal-fetal relationship
Id. (quoting Butler, J., in Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (1798)). See also Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal
Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1405-06 (1978).
18. Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation ofFetalRights Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 602 (1986).
19. Id. at 602-04. For example, many courts, in their determination of tort liability, use viabil-
ity of the fetus as the point at which a legal duty of care is owed to the fetus. See infra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
20. Johnsen, supra note 18, at 604.
21. This point has been extensively argued by many feminists and civil libertarians. See, eg.,
Johnsen, supra note 18; McNulty, supra note 15.
22. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 15, at 1333.
19921
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as well as the bias in the treatment of pregnant women in the workplace
as illustrations of the flawed definitions of pregnancy. Both biases per-
petuate a view of the pregnant woman as one whose identity is defined
relative to another - a fetus or a man. Part III concludes by suggesting
that although the inadequate legal treatment and definition of pregnancy
has been shaped by women's status, equality for women will be hindered
until the identity of a pregnant woman is completely independent and
autonomous.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL STATUS FOR THE FETUS
Although the cases of pregnant drug users and addicted newborns
dramatically illustrate fetal injury, exposing the complexities of the ma-
ternal-fetal relationship, the judiciary has long been confronted with is-
sues of criminal and civil liability for fetal injury.23 The principle
question which arose when courts were confronted with fetal injury is
whether the fetus can be defined as a person, and thus protected by civil
or criminal law. Standards in tort, family and criminal law have evolved
from viewing the fetus as part of its mother, to viewing it as a separate
entity which can be granted legal rights independent of the pregnant wo-
man. In all three areas of law, this has led to a growing trend of holding
pregnant women liable for harm incurred prenatally by the fetus.
A. Tort Law
One of the earliest decisions examining a cause of action for prenatal
injuries viewed the rights of the woman and the fetus as intertwined. In
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,24 Justice Holmes barred recovery
to the mother of a prematurely born child who had died from prenatal
injuries on the basis that the fetus was part of the woman's body, rather
than a separate legal entity at the time injury occurred.25 The presump-
tion behind the court's reasoning was that the defendant could owe no
duty of care to a person not in existence at the time of the defendant's
action.26
23. The social status of the fetus has historically garnered much attention, most often in the
context of abortion. As sociologist Kristin Luker explains: "Mhe moral status of the embryo has
always been ambiguous." KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 3 (1984)
(discussing various attitudes about the fetus throughout history).
24. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
25. "[Tjhat, as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage
to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her. .. ." Id. at 17.
26. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 55, at 367 (citing Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, as ex-
emplifying the common law standard that tort law could not recognize a cause of action for prenatal
[Vol. 40530
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The plaintiff mother, in arguing her case, relied on a common law
precedent in criminal law known as the "born alive" rule.27 According
to this rule, when a woman is quick with child,28 suffers assault or
poisoning, and the child is born alive but dies as a result of the injury, the
crime constitutes murder.29 Plaintiff mother had suffered a fall on a
highway when she was four to five months pregnant, causing her to give
birth prematurely to a live baby that died minutes after birth. She sought
to recover under a theory of negligence from the Town of Northamp-
ton.3" Although the common law precedent afforded a quick fetus pro-
tection from criminal acts,31 and precedent in property law allowed,
among other things, a legacy to be given to an unborn child,3 2 the Massa-
chusetts court refused to borrow from either to allow a suit under tort
injuries when no person was in existence at the time of injury). Since Justice Holmes mentioned the
fact that the fetus was not very developed, the decision could be read to suggest that a factor in
determining whether or not a fetus is a person is the stage of fetal development: "ITihe child,
although not directly injured, unless by a communication of the shock to the mother, was too little
advanced in foetal life to survive its premature birth." Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15.
27. See Karen G. Crockett & Miriam Hyman, Note, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recog-
nition of Rights, 4 HoFSTRA L. REV. 805 (1976) (discussing the prevalence of the "live birth" stan-
dard for granting the fetus any legal rights in property, criminal, and tort law).
28. A quick child is "one that has developed so that it moves within the mother's womb."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990).
29. According to the Dietrich court:
The plaintiff founds his argument mainly on a statement by Lord Coke, which seems to
have been accepted as law in England, to the effect that if a woman is quick with child,
and takes a potion, or if a man beats her, and the child is born alive and dies of the
potion or battery, this is murder.
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15. The statement made by Lord Coke was:
If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or other wise killeth it in her womb, or if
a man beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body and she is delivered of a dead child,
this is a great misprision, and not murder, but if the child be born alive and dieth of the
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura when it is born alive.
Robertson, supra note 17, at 1405 (quoting EDwARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTruTE's
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1797)).
30. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15.
31. See sources cited supra note 29.
32. See PROSSER, supra note 17. See also Johnsen, supra note 18, at 601, for an explanation of
the policy behind the ability to grant a legacy to a fetus.
One of these first instances of legal recognition of the fetus involved the right of inheri-
tance. Where a fetus existed at the time of death of the testator, the fetus was granted
the status of a person for the limited purposes of the inheritance, provided that it was
subsequently born alive. Fetuses were vested with inheritance rights contingent upon
live birth in recognition of parents' presumed desire to provide for children conceived
but not yet born at the time of their death.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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law on behalf of a prenatally harmed child.3 3 The Dietrich court, refus-
ing to adopt the "born alive" rule, articulated the traditional standard in
tort law: no recovery for prenatal injuries even when the child is born
alive.
The Dietrich standard for prenatal injuries was consistently followed
in every jurisdiction until the Bonbrest v. Kotz 34 decision in 1946. In
Bonbrest, the District of Columbia District Court engaged in a "spectac-
ular reversal of the no-duty [to fetus] rule,"' 35 when it allowed the parents
of an infant to sustain an action for the infliction of prenatal injuries
while the infant was being removed from its mother's womb.36 The court
distinguished this case from Dietrich by reasoning that while in Dietrich,
the injury was sustained by the mother, in this case a direct injury was
sustained by a "viable child."' 37 The court emphasized that, unlike Die-
33. The court reasoned:
If it should be argued that an action could be maintained in the case supposed, and that,
on general principles, an injury transmitted from the actor to a person through his own
organic substance, or through his mother, before he became a person, stands on the same
footing as an injury transmitted to an existing person through other intervening sub-
stances outside him, the argument in this general form is not helped, but hindered, by
the analogy drawn from Lord Coke's statement of the criminal law. For, apart from the
question of remoteness, the argument would not be affected by the degree of maturity
reached by the embryo at the moment of the organic lesion or wrongful act. Whereas
Lord Coke's rule requires that the woman be quick with child, which, as this court has
decided, means more than pregnant, and requires that the child shall have reached some
degree of quasi independent life at the moment of the act.
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16.
34. 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946) (stating that, prior to this case, all courts dealing with
this issue held that at common law, prenatal injury afforded no basis for an action in tort for either
the child or its personal representative). For examples of holdings where courts did not recognize a
cause of action for a prenatal injury, see Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900) (holding
that an action will not lie for prenatal injuries since there exists no common law precedent or statute
which recognizes such cause of action); Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that
tort standards recognized only the injuries sustained by the mother). The precursor to the Bonbrest
decision was Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire v. St Luke's Hospital, in which he argued that, since
the fetus had reached the point of viability by the time of injury, and could therefore continue to live
despite the death of its mother, the court should consider the fetus as a separate legal entity. Allaire,
56 N.E. at 641-42.
35. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 55, at 368. "The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in
every jurisdiction to maintain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of
such injuries after birth an action will lie for his wrongful death." Id.
36. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 143. The injuries were sustained by the infant as it was being
removed from the birth canal. Although it is not clear exactly what type of injury the infant in-
curred, it was apparently some type of brain damage, since the opinion of the court stated that the
injuries resulted in a "detrimental character." The parents were alleging professional malpractice.
Id. at 139.
37. The Bonbrest court stated:
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother - this argument seems ... to be a
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trich, "Nhere... we have a viable child - one capable of living outside
the womb - and which has demonstrated its capacity to survive by sur-
viving - are we to say now it has no locus standi in court or else-
where?"3 The Bonbrest court thus set a new standard for recovery
under tort law: recovery could be granted for injuries sustained
prenatally if the child was born alive.
The right of recovery for a viable child if born alive gained "immedi-
ate and uniform" judicial acceptance, 39 and was adopted by the Second
Restatement of Torts.4° Courts and commentators criticized the use of
viability4" as the point at which the law protects the fetus, arguing that
medical science has no clear or precise definition of viability or when it
occurs, rendering the concept too imprecise for legal argument or for the
definition of actual legal rights.42
Most courts came to agree that viability was too ambiguous a con-
contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extra-uterine life
- and while dependent for its continued development on sustenance derived from its
peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a "part" of the mother in the sense of a
constituent element - as that term is generally understood. Modern medicine is replete
with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers. Indeed, apart from viabil-
ity, a non-viable foetus is not part of its mother.
Id. at 140.
38. Id. The court articulated concern that if the wrong, in this case a tortious act committed
against a fetus, was not allowed a remedy, the child would have to bear the injury throughout his
life. Without recognizing the cause of action on behalf of the fetus, there could be no remedy for
that injury. The court also stated that it wished to keep pace with advances made in medicine and
science. Id. at 142-43.
39. Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liabilityfor Prenatal Injuries, 22 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 747, 752 (1988); see also Johnsen, supra note 18, at 601 (citing evidence that virtually all
American jurisdictions allow tort claims for prenatal injuries if the child is subsequently born alive).
40. "One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the
harm if the child is born alive." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1977).
41. Viability is "[a] term used to denote the power a new-bor child possesses of continuing its
independent existence. That stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be
continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1565 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Santello, supra note 39, at 752. The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized the problem of
ambiguity in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, commenting that
[t]he rule permitting a cause of action only where the child is viable at the time of the
injury has been criticized as a "most unsatisfactory criterion, since [viability] is a relative
matter, depending on the health of the mother and child and many other matters in
addition to the stage of development."
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (Ill. 1977) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 337 (4th ed. 1971)). See also Smith v. Brennan, 157
A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960) ("Where is no real way of determining in a borderline case whether or
not a fetus was viable at the time of injury, unless it was immediately born."). Ironically, although
Bonbrest was one of the first cases to articulate the legal importance of viability, the facts of the case
indicate that the injury actually occurred while the fetus was being extracted from its mother's birth
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cept, and turned to conception as the defining moment of legal protection
for the fetus.43 One example is Smith v. Brennan,4 a case in which an
infant suffered prenatal injuries from a car accident. The injuries caused
him to be born with club feet, and he was allowed to recover damages
from the negligent third party.4" The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the separate and independent existence of the fetus was not required
for compensation, pointing to medical and legal authority establishing
that a child is a person from conception.46 The court reasoned that the
infant's non-viability does not diminish the injury,47 further asserting
that a child has a "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body. ,48
Compensating a living child for injuries sustained prenatally, re-
canal. Thus, in that case, viability was not fraught with the same imprecision that became problem-
atic for courts and commentators.
43. See PROSSER, supra note 17, § 55, at 368. Prosser states:
Most of the cases allowing recovery have involved a fetus which was then viable, mean-
ing capable of independent life, if only in an incubator. Many of them have said, by way
of dictum, that recovery must be limited to such cases, and others have said that the
child, if not viable, must at least be "quick." But when actually faced with the issue for
decision, most courts have allowed recovery, even though the injury occurred during the
early weeks of pregnancy, when the child was neither viable nor quick.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing as examples: Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Bennett v.
Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Sinlder v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960); Smith v. Brennan,
157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1970)). See Robertson, supra note 17, at 1417-18. Robertson states:
Although the decisional law in a few jurisdictions suggests that viability at the time of
injury remains a requirement for recovery, it is probably that these cases have lost their
vitality, remaining as apparent authority only because no case posing the issue of liability
for previability injuries has yet reached the appellate courts of those jurisdictions. It
appears that the viability rule is dead in causes of action for prenatal injuries brought by
living infants.
Id. (footnote omitted).
44. 157 A.2d 497 (NJ. 1960).
45. Id.
46. The court stated that:
[t]he third reason for the rule denying recovery was the theory that an unborn child was
a part of the mother, and therefore not a person in being to whom a duty of care could be
owed. All the courts that have permitted recovery for prenatal injuries have disagreed
with that theory. They have found that the existence of an infant separate from its
mother begins before birth. Medical authorities have long recognized that a child is in
existence from the moment of conception, and not merely a part of its mother's body.
Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 504.
48. Id. at 503. The court also stated:
The semantic argument whether an unborn child is a "person in being" seems to us to be
beside the point. There is no question that conception sets in motion biological processes
which if undisturbed will produce what every one will concede to be a person in being.
If in the meanwhile those processes can be disrupted resulting in harm to the child when
born, it is immaterial whether before birth the child is considered a person in being. And
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gardless of whether the injury occurred at the point of viability, realizes
one of the primary purposes of tort law - compensation for injury.49
The common law, through such decisions as Bonbrest and Smith, effectu-
ated this goal in a manner which was consistent with the interests of a
50pregnant woman, since deterrence from injury protects the life and
health of both the pregnant woman and the fetus. However, one court
has interpreted the increased protection for the fetus as a grant of legal
rights independent of its mother. In Grodin v. Grodin,5' a child sued his
mother for negligence because she took tetracycline while pregnant,
causing him to be born with discolored teeth. 2 A previous decision of
the court held that a child had a cause of action for prenatal injuries
inflicted by another, 3 and the Grodin court decided that "another" could
be interpreted to mean the child's mother.5 4 Although the child was able
to bring the cause of action in part because of the breakdown of parental
immunity,51 the court also relied on the right of the child to be born
regardless of analogies to other areas of the law, justice requires that the principle be
recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.
Id.
49. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 6. See also Crockett & Hyman, supra note 27, at 825.
It would clearly be unfair to the postnatal child to refuse compensation merely because
the injury occurred during the prenatal period. The intention in granting recovery in
cases of this type is, however, to compensate the postnatal child for the affliction it must
bear. Recovery is not, therefore, a recognition that the prenatal child has legal rights.
Id.
50. See Johnsen, supra note 18, at 601-02.
The purpose of tort law is to provide compensation to victims of tortious conduct and, to
a lesser extent, to deter such harmful acts. It is consistent with these purposes to allow a
child to recover against third parties for afflictions she or he presently suffers as a result
of tortious conduct inflicted on the pregnant woman. In recognizing born plaintiffs'
rights to sue for injuries suffered prenatally, tort law provides a means of compensating
children and their parents.
The law of fetal rights in its first phase thus did not afford rights to the fetus qua
fetus.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
51. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Id. The court defined the issue as whether the taking of tetracycline while pregnant was one
of reasonable parental discretion, and remanded the case to determine this fact.
53. The court cited Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971), as the precedent
establishing a cause of action in tort for prenatal injuries. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
54. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870 ("The rationale of Smith v. Brennan, adopted by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Womack, refers only to wrongful conduct of 'another' for which compensable
damages are available. As a result, the litigating child's mother would bear the same liability for
injurious, negligent conduct as would a third person.").
55. Id. at 870. The court explained that intrafamilial tort immunity had been overruled, with
two exceptions:
(I) when the act was one of reasonable parental authority, or (2) when the act involved
an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, cloth-
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"with a sound mind and body," which was first articulated in Smith.5 6
Grodin illustrates how increased legal recognition for the fetus can
serve to posit the fetus and its mother as adversaries. In Grodin, the issue
became "whether the decision reached by a woman in a particular case
was a 'reasonable exercise of parental discretion.' "'I When the issue of
"reasonableness" is balanced against the right of the fetus to be born "of
sound mind and body," the rights of the fetus can conflict with those of
the mother.5 8 For example, although no other court has allowed a child
to bring a prenatal injury cause of action against his or her mother,59 a
California appellate court suggested that a mother can be sued by her
child for not preventing its birth if she had prior knowledge of the
probability of its being born "defective."'  Thus, the mother can be al-
lowed little discretion, because the appeal of protecting a child's physical
integrity can outweigh the legal protection or respect granted to a
mother's decision. This phenomenon is well demonstrated by cases
where courts, with the purported rationale of protecting the fetus, have
denied a pregnant woman her wishes concerning her pregnancy.61 Com-
ing, housing, [or] medical and dental services.... Many American courts have recog-
nized several exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine, due to a growing concern
that many minors were not being compensated for their injuries.
See David E. Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the Prenatal Period, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 493 (1989).
56. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
57. Id. at 871 ("The reasonableness of the risk of harm whether analyzed in terms of duty,
proximate cause or a specific standard of care turns on how the utility of the defendant's conduct is
viewed in relation to the magnitude of the risk thereby created." (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 199
N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972)).
58. Koropp, supra note 55, at 503 (pointing out that the right to be born of sound mind and
body, along with the general abrogation of parental immunity, "logically leads to the dilemma of
children bringing suit against their mother for injuries she negligently inflicts during pregnancy").
59. See Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 15, at 1331, and accompanying text; see also
Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (refusing to accept the argument that a five
month old fetus was a person who could bring a negligence action after birth against her mother).
60. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980). The court
explained:
If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in transmitting the
necessary warnings, parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy, with
full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be born, that conscious choice
would provide an intervening act of proximate cause to preclude liability insofar as de-
fendants other than the parents were concerned. Under such circumstances, we see no
sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the
pain, suffering, and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring.
Id. Although the reasoning of the California court was primarily dictum, it illustrates the extent to
which courts can regard fetal and maternal interests as hostile.
61. See, eg., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (Court of Appeals upheld trial court decision
ordering terminally ill woman to undergo a caesarean against her will, reasoning that the state's
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mentators have rightfully argued that such judicial intrusion into preg-
nant women's non-criminal behavior violates a woman's right to privacy,
and subordinates the rights of the mother to those of the fetus. 2 In fact,
the standard of reasonableness becomes defined not by the degree of a
mother's care, but by an exaggerated concern for fetal well-being. The
increased protection for the fetus in tort law is a factor in the conceptual-
ization of the fetus as a separate legal entity, which must be protected at
the expense of a pregnant woman's right to privacy and bodily
integrity. 63
B. Family Law
The concern for the fetus under tort law as discussed in the previous
section has contributed to the current trend of holding pregnant women
civilly liable under child neglect statutes" - another example of pitting
the fetus against its mother. Because courts must define the fetus as a
child for the purpose of charging pregnant drug users under child abuse
interest in the potential life of the fetus outweighed the woman's right to bodily integrity). See also
Jennifer Beulah Lew, Note, Terminally Ill and Pregnant" State Denial of a WomanIs Right to Refuse
a Caesarean Section, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 619 (1990) (arguing that the rising incidence of court-ordered
caesareans violates women's autonomy and bodily integrity).
62. The Pamela Ray Stewart case, State v. Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct., Cal.
Feb. 26, 1987), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 2, spawned a public debate over the
right of the state to monitor pregnant women's behavior. See, eg., Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal
Wrongs, supra note 16. Ms. Stewart was arrested under a criminal child support statute and charged
with child abuse for "failing to follow her doctor's advice to stay off her feet, to refrain from sexual
intercourse, to refrain from taking street drugs, and [to] seek immediate medical attention, if she
experienced difficulties with her pregnancy." Id. at 994; Case Summary, supra note 2, at 2. Critics
of the case argued that the standard articulated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), asserts that a woman's right to bodily integrity and privacy in
procreational choices should be respected unless the state has a compelling interest to justify state
intrusion. For instance, while difficult to designate cigarette smoking as deserving of compelling
state interest, penalizing a pregnant heroin addict would be constitutional because the harm is much
more significant. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 16, at 1007.
63. See Comment, Criminal Liability of a Prospective Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable
Fetus, 9 WHrrrIaR L. REV. 363, 386 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Criminal Liability] (arguing that
the legal foundation for establishing a pregnant woman's legal responsibility, and thus liability, for
the health and safety of her newborn was established in Smith v. Brennan when the court set a
widely followed precedent that a child had a right to be born of sound mind and body).
64. See Department of Social Services ex rel. Mark S. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638
(Fain. Ct. 1989) (declaring that the decision to uphold a neglect petition based on the finding of
cocaine in an infant's blood "simply brings the law of this state into accord with the demand for
natural justice, which requires recognition of the legal right of every human being to begin life
unimpaired by physical, mental or emotional defects resulting from the neglectful acts of the par-
ent"); See also In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 1986) (which set a precedent for using the
conduct of a pregnant woman to establish child abuse based on the proposition established in Smith
v. Brennan, that a child has the right to begin life with a sound mind and body).
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and child neglect laws, this trend both relies on and perpetuates the no-
tion that a woman is separate from her fetus.6" The Michigan Court of
Appeals set a precedent for finding the behavior of a pregnant woman
probative of child neglect in 1980. In In re Baby X,66 a baby was born
suffering narcotic withdrawal symptoms because of his mother's drug
abuse while pregnant. The Michigan court held that, because a child has
a right to be born of sound mind and body, it is in the best interest of the
child to examine all prenatal conduct that affects that right.67 Although
the court, citing Roe v. Wade,6" conceded "there is no wholesale recogni-
tion of fetuses as persons," 69 it held that limited recognition of a fetus as
a child is permissible when it is in the child's best interest.70
When courts in New York,7 1 Ohio72 and California 73 subsequently
addressed the issue of prenatal conduct as evidence of future neglect of
the child, the courts' holdings were similar to that of the Michigan court.
All of these courts have defined the fetus as a child. A California court
relied on In re Baby X to take custody of a child born suffering from the
prenatal drug use of his mother, declaring that the drug use of a pregnant
woman is probative of future child neglect.74 In New York, courts have
held that a mother's abuse of alcohol and failure to seek rehabilitative or
prenatal care while pregnant constituted neglect75 by relying on the Roe
Court's reasoning that a state has an important and legal interest in pro-
tecting potentiality of life when a child is viable in order to grant legal
65. See In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938
(C.P. Wood County, Ohio 1986); In re Male R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 825 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (the court
found a mother guilty of child neglect, but would not base this finding on her prenatal substance
abuse alone); see also Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977) (the court dis-
missed child endangerment charges against a woman who gave birth to twins who were addicted to
heroin because of their mother's prenatal substance abuse, holding that the statute was not intended
to apply to prenatal conduct).
66. 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
67. Id. at 739.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. 293 NAV.2d at 738.
70. Id. at 738-39.
71. In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Far. Ct. 1985) (holding that a pregnant woman's failure to
seek prenatal care, as well as her continued abuse of alcohol, was sufficient proof that the newborn
child was in imminent danger of impairment); In re Theresa J., 551 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1990)
(finding neglect on the basis of the mother's admission to using cocaine before the birth of her child,
and because the mother tested positive for cocaine); Department of Social Services ex rel. Mark S. v.
Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Far. Ct. 1989) (upholding a neglect petition on the basis of mother's
use of cocaine while pregnant, and her child's positive toxicology for cocaine).
72. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. Wood County, Ohio 1986).
73. In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989).
74. Id. at 899 (holding that prenatal drug abuse is probative of future child neglect).
75. See cases cited supra note 71.
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recognition of the fetus. 6
An Ohio court also relied on viability to determine the separate
existence of a fetus in In re Ruiz. 7 The court held that a viable fetus is a
"child" under the state's child abuse statute, and harm to it may be con-
sidered abuse.78 To define the legal rights of the fetus, the court relied on
the development of fetal rights under tort law, along with the Roe
Court's articulation of the state's compelling interest in a viable fetus.7 9
The court held that in order to give effect to the state's compelling inter-
est in protecting a viable fetus, child abuse and neglect laws must be
interpreted to include the unborn. °
Commentators, attorneys and courts have presented constitutional
arguments against the conviction of pregnant addicts under child abuse
and neglect statutes."1 One argument articulated is that the legal stan-
dard for conviction of child abuse or neglect is the potential for future
harm, which is not established by a woman's pregnant behavior.8 2
Although some courts cited the common law proposition that past events
can aid in a determination of present unfitness, 83 one commentator points
out this rule had previously been applied only to prior treatment of an
actual child, not a fetus.84 The Supreme Court struck down an Illinois
statute which failed to require inquiry into a father's fitness before his
child became a ward of the state.85 The requirement of substantive in-
quiry into a parent's fitness articulated by the Court suggests that defin-
ing the behavior of pregnant women as conduct determinative of future
neglect could be unconstitutional. 86
76. See In re Fathima Ashanti KJ., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Farn. Ct. 1990) (stating that as long
as a state can outlaw abortion after the fetus is viable, then it can also protect the fetus from neglect
while still in the womb). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
77. 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. Wood County, Ohio 1986).
78. Id. at 939.
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
80. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
81. See, eg., Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278
(1990); In re Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (Faro. Ct. 1988) (holding that prenatal drug use can-
not be the basis for finding neglect if there is no showing of continued drug use putting the child in
danger); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 16; Johnsen, supra note 18, at 614.
82. Moss, supra note 81, at 290.
83. Department of Social Services ex rel. Mark S. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Farn. Ct.
1989) ("It is a basic rule of common law that one's actions instant may have consequences at a later
time.").
84. Moss, supra note 81, at 292.
85. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
86. Moss, supra note 81, at 292. Moss argues "[t]o presume parental unfitness given these facts
is probably unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court has overturned laws that relied on a presump-
tion of unfitness to deprive parents of custody without a substantive inquiry into the parents' actual
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Due process rights of pregnant women also are implicated because
women are deprived of fair notice that child abuse and neglect laws will
be interpreted to apply to fetuses and maternal behavior.8 7 When an in-
dividual's life, liberty or property is to be curtailed by the government,
that individual must receive notice from the government, which usually
occurs through the publication of laws passed by the legislature. 88 The
Supreme Court has held that unforeseeable applications of law deprive a
petitioner of fair notice and, consequently, due process.8 9 The fair notice
requirement of due process is lacking when women have no warning that
their fetuses will be defined as children under child abuse and neglect
laws. These constitutional issues also surface when pregnant women face
criminal charges for injury to the fetus during their pregnancy, as dis-
cussed in the following section.
C. Criminal Law
Traditionally, under criminal common law, if the fetus suffered
harm while in its mother's womb, was subsequently born alive, and then
died, the crime constituted murder.9 Although commentators have ar-
gued this common law standard accorded the fetus actual legal status as
a person,91 for these legal rights to actually vest, the fetus had to be born
alive.92 The requirement of live birth, or the "born alive" rule was con-
fitness." She cites Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) because the Court "str[uck] down an
Illinois rule which stated that children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon mother's
death, regardless of father's fitness." Moss, supra note 81, at 290 n.78.
87. See Comment, Criminal Liability, supra note 63, at 387.
88. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 530 (4th ed.
1991).
89. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973). See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 352 (1964) (deprivation of right of fair warning can result from an unforeseeable and retroactive
judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language).
90. See Robertson, supra note 17, at 1405 (quoting Lord Coke's statement of the "born alive"
rule).
91. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983) ("This preference for fetal interests over maternal free-
dom during pregnancy is rooted in an enduring criminal law tradition .... ); Margery W. Shaw,
Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 95-104 (1984).
92. The live birth requirement is consistent with the general requirement of homicide that the
victim be a living human being, thus qualifying as a person. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(c), at 607 (2nd ed. 1986). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, the
court declared that "except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent
upon live birth[] .... the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense." Id. at 161-62; see also Robertson, supra note 17, at 1405 (quoting statements made by Black-
stone and Coke which defined murder as being contingent upon the infant's being born alive,
whereas if the infant died in the mother's womb, it was a "heinous misdemeanor").
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sistent with the prevailing view that the fetus is part of its mother, and
has no independent existence until it is born and has established a sepa-
rate existence. 93 Thus, as the woman was the locus of legal rights, and
the fetus was defined as part of its mother, the fetus was not actually
accorded an independent legal existence.
Although the "born alive" rule has remained the standard for crimi-
nal liability for most states,94 a few state courts and legislatures have
recognized the fetus as an independent entity without actual live birth.
The first court to relax the live birth requirement was the California Ap-
pellate Court in People v. Chavez.95 Unlike the stringent common law
standard which required that the fetus be fully expelled from the birth
canal, and have signs of independent blood circulation and respiration,96
the Chavez court held a fetus can be considered a person for the purposes
of homicide law during the birthing process, before it was completely
separate from its mother.9 7 The court noted the common law rule had
been established at a time when childbirth was extremely threatening to
the lives of the pregnant woman and her fetus, and reflected a reluctance
to hold either the woman or her physician liable for any harm to the
newborn infant which occurred during the birthing process.98 Given the
birthing process was no longer as dangerous, and the current scientific
understanding was that the separate existence of a fetus could occur
before it left its mother's womb, the court held the defendant mother
guilty of manslaughter for the death of her newborn which occurred
through her negligence during the birthing process.9 9 Like Bonbrest, the
Chavez court established a degree of legal protection for the fetus which
93. Johnsen, supra note 18, explains:
The limited contexts in which courts first recognized the fetus involved rights that were
granted to children. These rights of children were unique in that they required acknowl-
edging a child's prior existence as a fetus in her or his mother's womb. Yet because they
contained a live birth requirement, these narrow exceptions were consistent with the
prevailing view of the fetus as part of the woman. The fetus was not given any rights
independent of its mother; rather, it was only after the fetus became a person at birth
that it acquired legal rights as a separate entity.
Id. at 601.
94. See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 92, at § 7.1(c).
95. 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1947).
96. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 92, at § 7.1(c).
97. 176 P.2d at 94.
98. Id. at 93-94. The mother gave birth while sitting on a toilet and the newborn dropped into
the water. She cut the umbilical cord but did not tie it. The autopsy could not determine if the baby
died from suffocation or hemorrhage from the untied cord. The mother did not seek assistance from
family members in the house or medical personnel during or after the birth. Id. at 92-93, 95.
99. Id. at 94, 96.
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was not contingent upon the separation of the fetus from its mother. On
one hand, neither decision made a dramatic change in the status of the
fetus because the harm to the fetus had occurred during the birthing pro-
cess, a time when the identities of fetus and newborn begin to merge.
However, both Bonbrest and Chavez are significant because they identi-
fied the fetus as a legal entity whose rights could be enforced separately
from its mother.
In Commonwealth v. Cass,'" a Massachusetts court also relaxed the
live birth requirement when it held that a viable fetus was a "person"
under the state's vehicular homicide statute, and thus a potential homi-
cide victim.10 1 The court rejected concerns of the judiciary overstepping
its power, and stated precedent and the elasticity of common law as sup-
port."02 The court also satisfied the due process requirement of providing
adequate notice of potential criminal behavior by declaring that its inter-
pretation of the vehicular homicide law was only to be applied
prospectively. 103
Most courts, however, confronted with cases where a viable fetus
died as a result of an injury from a third person, refrained from relaxing
the born alive standard, holding the third person could not be liable
under homicide laws if the fetus was not born alive."° Three reasons
were consistently stated for this holding: the judiciary could not intrude
into the realm of the legislature by redefining homicide laws that had
been codified; defining "person" in homicide laws to include fetus was
contrary to legislative intent; and criminal statutes must be strictly con-
strued to provide adequate notice of potentially criminal behavior."'0 If
100. 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
101. Id. at 1325. The court stated:
In keeping with approved usage, and giving terms their ordinary meaning, the word
'person' is synonymous with the term 'human being.' An offspring of human parents
cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human being, and therefore a person,
first within, and then in normal course outside, the womb.
Id.
102. Id. at 1327 ("Preexisting common law meaning may be a useful indication of legislative
intent. However, to conclude that mere use of the term was intended to freeze its meaning is to
make a shibboleth of a rule of construction") (citing Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d
916 (Mass. 1975)).
103. Id. at 1327.
104. See, eg., Keeler v. Superior Court of Armador County, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970); People v.
Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (II1. 1980); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); State v.
Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); State
v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1977); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978).
105. See cases cited supra note 104. Although courts recognized that civil liability under tort
law had been expanded to include the infliction of prenatal injuries sustained by a fetus, courts have
rejected this as a reason to expand criminal liability. Courts have stated that the different objectives
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adequate notice of criminal behavior is not supplied, either through prior
holdings of the court or through legislative action, the constitutional
right of a defendant to due process is violated.106 Often in response to a
court's unwillingness to define fetus as a "person" under homicide
law,10 7 as well as to bypass any constitutional violations, a number of
state legislatures adopted "feticide" statutes, where the murder of a fetus
is treated the same as the murder of a person. °1s Unlike the "born alive"
rule at common law, the legislative action indicates a recognition of the
fetus as a separate entity which is entitled to legal protection before it
leaves its mother's womb.
Increased legal recognition for the fetus has developed into legal
rights for the fetus which are independent from the rights of the pregnant
woman. These rights are evidenced by the courts' willingness to apply
criminal child abuse and neglect statutes to the behavior of pregnant wo-
men,"9 which is only possible if the courts interpret statutes that refer to
children to include the fetus. As with the application of civil child ne-
glect statutes to the behavior of pregnant women, defining the fetus as a
child for the purpose of criminal child abuse and neglect statutes illus-
trates the notion that the pregnant woman and her fetus are separate and
adversarial entities. In addition, the same constitutional problems of ad-
equate notice are posed. 10 In the last two years, fifty-three women have
been arrested on criminal charges because of their behavior during preg-
nancy."1 Besides four additional instances where women have been
of civil and criminal law, one being to remedy and the other being to punish, should dictate differing
constructions of civil and criminal standards, with civil standards being construed broadly and crim-
inal standards being construed narrowly.
106. See supra notes 87-89.
107. Mary E. Barrazotto, Note, Judicial Recognition of Feticide" Usurping the Power of the Leg-
islature?, 24 J. FAM. L. 43, 51-52 (1985-86).
108. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(9) (West 1988) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West
1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1986); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.32.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982).
109. See infra notes 112 & 115.
110. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
111. Overview, supra note 15, at 1. Not included in this figure is a 1987 case that received much
media attention, State v. Stewart, No. M508 197 (San Diego Mun. Ct., Cal. Feb. 26, 1987), discussed
in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 2, where Pamela Rae Stewart was arrested under a criminal child
support statute and charged with "failing to follow her doctor's advice to stay off her feet, to refrain
from sexual intercourse, refrain from taking street drugs, and seek immediate medical attention, if
she experienced difficulties with the pregnancy." The court dismissed the charges, finding that Cali-
fornia's child support statute did not apply to the actions of a pregnant woman. Id.
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charged with criminal child abuse,1 12 the charges against pregnant wo-
men have ranged from negligent homicide,1 13 motor vehicle homicide, 14
child endangerment,11 5 contributing to the dependency of a minor, 116
and drug delivery to a minor. The trend spans fifteen states,1 17 with suc-
cessfully prosecuted or pending cases in eight states."'
Part I demonstrates that the increased judicial recognition of the
fetus as an independent entity in tort, family, and criminal law, has al-
lowed courts to punish a pregnant woman in the name of her fetus. Ap-
plying statutes which were intended to punish women's parental
behavior to women's behavior while pregnant is problematic for two rea-
sons: women's parental duties are expanded, while men's parental duties
are not, which discriminates against women; and it sets the stage for new
and even greater infringements of women's rights, such as the drug deliv-
ery strategy. The emergence of the drug delivery strategy, subsequently
112. See State v. Welch, No. 90-CR-006 (Boyd Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 15, 1990), discussed in, Case
Summary, supra note 2, at 8, jury trial found long time drug addict who gave birth to addicted infant
guilty of child abuse in the second degree and possession of drugs, sentencing her to five years in
jail); State v. Bloxham, No. RJC-36887 (Reno Justice Ct., Nev. Feb. 2, 1990), discussed in, Case
Summary, supra note 2, at 10; State v. Peters, No. 90-241. (Sparks Justice Ct., Nev. Feb. 2, 1990),
discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 10; and State v. Pfannenstiel, No. 1-90-CR (Laramie
County Ct., Wy. Jan. 5, 1990), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 14.
113. State v. Grubbs, No. 4FA 589415 Criminal (Alaska, Aug. 25, 1989), discussed in, Case
Summary, supra note 2, at 1 (finding mother of an infant who died two weeks after birth from a
heart attack caused by maternal cocaine use guilty of criminal negligent homicide and sentencing her
to six months in jail and five years probation).
114. Commonwealth v. Levey, No. 89-2725-2729 (Super. Ct. of Mass. Dec. 4, 1989), discussed
in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 8 (pregnant woman whose miscarriage was the result of her
alleged drunk driving was originally charged with motor vehicle homicide, but the charges were
dropped after she completed a court ordered drug treatment program).
115. State v. Gray, No. CR88-7406 (Ct. C.P. of Lucas County, Ohio July 13, 1989), discussed
in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 11 (trial court refused to extend Ohio child endangerment statute
to include fetus of woman who had used cocaine during her pregnancy; the state has appealed the
case).
116. State v. Christenson, No. CRI. 90- (S.D. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1990), discussed in, Case
Summary, supra note 2, at 12-13 (woman cocaine user gave birth to baby with cocaine in its blood-
stream, was charged and found guilty of contributing to the dependency of a minor and ingestion of
a toxic substance).
117. These states are: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming.
Case Summary, supra note 2.
118. As of May 1991, according to the ACLU Case Summary, supra note 2, criminal charges
against women for prenatal substance abuse have been successful, or are pending initial trial or
appeal in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina and
South Dakota. Although the prosecution has been unsuccessful in an equal number of states, the
actual number of unsuccessful cases is much higher (21) than the number of successful cases (6).
Case Summary, supra note 2.
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discussed in Part II, is a continuation of the trend of punishing women
under tort, family and criminal law.
II. PREGNANCY AS DRUG TRAFFCKING
The first woman to be convicted under a drug trafficking statute for
giving birth to an infant who tested positive for cocaine was Jennifer
Johnson in Johnson v. State."9 Since then, this innovative prosecutorial
strategy has been used in other states and has been discussed as a viable
strategy by an increasing number of prosecutors.' 20 Although nine cases
of drug delivery charges have been dismissed,' 2 1 fourteen others are still
pending, concentrated in Michigan, Florida, South Carolina and Geor-
gia. 12 Part II criticizes the use of the drug delivery strategy by present-
ing the statutory and constitutional arguments against it. Section A
demonstrates the strategy's reliance on incorrect and biased statutory
construction, and Section B demonstrates the strategy's violation of wo-
men's rights.
A. Biased Statutory Construction
Prosecuting pregnant women as drug dealers who "deal" drugs
through their umbilical cords is not legally sound. In order to prosecute
women under the drug trafficking statutes, prosecutors have defined the
119. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief from the National Association for Per-
inatal Addiction Research and Education on behalf of Jennifer Johnson at 1, Johnson v. State, 578
So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (No. 89-1765).
120. The National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, an affiliate of the National District
Attorneys Association, held a conference in July of 1990 entitled "Substance Abused Infants: A
Prosecutorial Dilemma," where participants discussed the pros and cons of prosecutorial strategies
attempted thus far, and a variety of new or developing programs to address parental drug abuse.
NCPCA UPDATE, supra note 15. Participants agreed that the "right of children to be born free from
the effect of illicit drugs" must be protected. Their response included a desire to use multidiscipli-
nary approaches, which include increasing supportive systems, offering to dismiss charges against
pregnant drug abusers that come forward to be rehabilitated, and "creative use of the justice system
to encourage treatment and protect children at risk." Id. According to the Case Summary, supra
note 2, at 2, a county attorney in Arizona returned from this conference announcing a campaign to
prosecute pregnant drug users. Cf Graybiel, supra note 2, at 1A (Florida State Attorney Curtis
Golden stated that although the state will continue to prosecute on delivery charges, most "prosecu-
tors end up striking plea agreements with most of the mothers because of the difficulty of proving the
delivery charge. They drop the delivery charge and allow the women to plead no contest to the less
serious possession charge.").
121. Overview, supra note 15, at 4. This figure does not include the dismissal of drug delivery
charges against Lynne Bremer in Michigan as reported in Judge Drops Charges of Delivering Drugs
To an Unborn Baby, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1991, at B6. See People v. Bremer, No. 90-3227-FH (Cir.
Ct. Muskegon County, Mich. Jan. 31, 1991), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 10.
122. See supra notes 1-4.
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words "delivery," "minor," and "controlled substance" in a novel and
biased manner. The state drug trafficking statutes invoked in the various
cases are similar to the Florida statute § 893.13(1)(c) invoked in the
Johnson case: "it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to
deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years
".;123 and § 893.13(1)(a), invoked in the trial of another Florida wo-
man, Ethel Carter: "it is unlawful for any person to sell, purchase, man-
ufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, purchase manufacture,
or deliver, a controlled substance." 124 By defining maternal drug use as
drug trafficking, the drug delivery strategy criminalizes pregnant wo-
men's behavior in a way similar to the strategies outlined in Part I.
These new strategies dole out harsher penalties for drug possession or
drug use solely because the women are pregnant; they rest on the premise
that the entities of fetus and child are interchangeable; and they presume
that the fetus should be the locus of protection. Thus, construing drug
use during pregnancy as drug trafficking reflects a bias against pregnant
women.
Prosecutors have claimed to avoid the problem of defining a fetus as
a minor by presenting the argument that the controlled substance passed
to the newborn after it left the birth canal and before the umbilical cord
was cut or clamped. 125 Consequently the newborn is as separate from its
mother as possible, arguably qualifying as a "minor," while still retaining
123. FLA. PENAL CODE § 893.13(1)(c) (1989).
124. FLA. PENAL CODE § 893.13(l)(a) (1989). Other states have similar statutes. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 94C, § 32F(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991):
any person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or pos-
sesses with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance in Class
B of section thirty-one to a person under the age of eighteen years shall be punished by a
term of imlirisonment in the state prison for not less than three nor more than fifteen
years. No sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be for less than a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years.
The above statute was invoked in the prosecution of Massachusetts woman Josephine Pellegrini,
Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990). The case
was dismissed at the trial court level. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a) (iv) (1990),
under which Kimberly Hardy is being prosecuted in Michigan.
125. An article in the ABA Journal, see Curriden, supra note 14, at 51, contains a prosecutor's
account of developing the "delivery" strategy:
[Florida prosecutor Jeff] Deen says he deliberately did not set out to prove "fetal abuse":
"We knew Florida law didn't cover actions to the fetus, so our theory sort of developed
privately and was not revealed until the trial." Instead, says Deen, the prosecution fo-
cused on injuries sustained at the time of birth. "When the ACLU got involved, they
thought we were talking about an actual in-utero attack and they really blasted me in
pretrial motions. But none of it really applied because we weren't talking about a fetus,
but a real, live baby."
[Vol. 40
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the means of "delivery" - the umbilical cord. However, it is not clear
that a fetus expelled from the birth canal, yet attached to its mother via
the umbilical cord, can correctly be defined as a person under the law.
In searching for the appropriate legal definition for the fetus, prose-
cutors, defense attorneys and courts involved in drug delivery cases have
referred to the "born alive" precedent in tort and criminal law. For ex-
ample, in State v. Carter,'26 the prosecution argued that under Florida
tort law for wrongful death actions, once the fetus is born alive, it has a
legally separate and independent existence, regardless of whether the um-
bilical cord has been severed. 27 The defense in Johnson disagreed, and
argued that the existence of the attached umbilical cord cannot be dis-
counted, as it provides the very means of connection precluding a sepa-
rate and independent existence of the newborn; namely, it is evidence
that the newborn has not established a separate circulatory system which
is required for legal personhood. 128 The defense in Johnson also relied on
the standard in wrongful death actions to support their argument.
129
One court rejected the precedent set in wrongful death, vehicular homi-
cide, and murder cases, which defined a viable fetus as a person, holding
126. State v. Carter, No. 90-2261, slip op. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 23, 1990), discussed in, Case
Summary, supra note 2, at 4-5.
127. Initial Brief for Appellant at 7, State v. Carter, No. 90-2261, slip op. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
July 23, 1990). In this case, the precedent cited by the prosecution was a wrongful death case. See
id. (discussing Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So.2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
128. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 15, Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (No. 89-1765) ('under Florida law, a fetus is not 'born' until it has acquired a 'separate and
independent existence of its mother,' i.e., until the umbilical cord is cut and the mother and fetus
have separate circulatory systems") (citing Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1978)).
129. Appellant's Initial Brief at 30, Johnson (No. 89-1765) (citing Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So.2d
123, 126 (Fla. 1978)). The defense also pointed to other jurisdictions that require a separate circula-
tory system in both civil and criminal actions for establishing the fetus as a legally separate entity at
footnote 24:
Florida is not alone in taking this view. See People v. Yen Wang, 128 Misc.2d 554, 490
N.Y.S.2d 423, 425-26 (1985) (newborn infant not a person within meaning of homicide
statute until it possessed circulation independent of mother); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y.
171, 174, 90 N.E.2d 23, 24 (1949) (legal test of live birth is the ability to exist "without
the help of the mother's circulation"); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 420-21, 256 S.W.
433 (1923) (newborn cannot be subject of homicide "until it has an existence independ-
ent of its mother. It is usually said that the umbilical cord must have been severed, and
an independent circulation established."); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876) (absent
independent circulation, newborn cannot be subject of homicide). See also Lane v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 509, 248 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1978) ("[T]he traditional and prevailing
view expressed by courts from other jurisdictions is that in a prosecution for killing a
newly born baby, it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the child was born alive
and had an independent and separate existence apart from its mother....").
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that the standard established in those actions does not apply to a cause of
action that treats the mother and fetus as adversaries. 130 The court dis-
tinguished the drug delivery case before it from wrongful death and ve-
hicular homicide actions, stating that since in the drug delivery case the
woman's right to privacy was invoked, the court "cannot liberally apply
principles of statutory interpretation, due process and separation of
powers."
13 1
Although prosecutors may attempt to avoid implication of fetal
rights by defining the fetus as a child, 132 in actuality the drug delivery
strategy is inaccurate unless it is extended to include the fetus. For ex-
ample, in Johnson, the prosecution successfully used the argument that
the controlled substance was delivered to the "minor" in the sixty to
ninety seconds after it left the birth canal and before the umbilical cord
was severed.1 33 However, the evidence does not support that fact, be-
cause the controlled substance could have passed from the mother any
time after she smoked crack and cannot be narrowed down to the sixty to
ninety seconds after the child left the birth canal. 134 Moreover, in the
Johnson case, the umbilical cord was neither tested for a derivative of
cocaine nor preserved for evidence, further weakening the prosecution's
case that the "delivery" occurred through the umbilical cord after birth
130. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 10 (Super. Ct. of Mass. Oct. 15, 1990)
(citing Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467
N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); and Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989)).
131. Pellegrini, No. 87970 at 10. The constitutional issues mentioned by the court here are
discussed in the following section of this Note.
132. Lynne Paltrow from the ACLU calls Prosecutor Dean's theory that the prosecution is
invoking the rights of the child and not the fetus "a distinction without a difference." Curriden,
supra note 14, at 51.
133. Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, Johnson (No. 89-1765). The trial court found that a child
who is born but whose umbilical cord has not been severed is a "person" within the intent and
meaning of Florida Statute § 893.13(1)(c)(1), and that "the term 'delivery' includes the passage of
cocaine or a derivative of it from the body of a mother into the body of her child through the
umbilical cord after birth occurs." State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1989), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 5-6. The judge also stated:
I do not view this case to be a case of prosecution going amuck. Nor do I view the case
as calling for judicial restraint. The law pertaining to delivery of a controlled substance
has been applied to a broad variety of situations. Failure to previously prosecute these
cases shows nothing more than a lack of awareness that these facts might constitute a
crime and a resulting failure to investigate.
Id. at 2.
134. Moss, supra note 81, at 282. Dr. Ira Chasnoff, President of the National Association of
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, has stated his disapproval of the theory that cocaine is
passed through the umbilical cord just before it's clamped, explaining: "Good ethics and good law
have to be based on good science ... and we just don't have that kind of data." Hoffman, supra note
14, at 35.
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of the child.135 In general, and in the Johnson case, the harm to the so-
called "child" is harm that actually occurs prenatally, and the drug is
passed to the fetus, not the child or minor.
Interpreting the word "delivery" in drug trafficking statutes to in-
clude the passage of blood through a pregnant woman's umbilical cord to
her fetus is also highly problematic. First, the interpretation violates the
intent of the legislature. The Florida and Michigan legislatures, for in-
stance, sought to control drug trafficking; they did not intend for the
statute to be applied to pregnant drug users.1 36  Second, judicial con-
struction of the drug trafficking statute to include the passage of blood
within an umbilical cord is outside the plain meaning of the statute, and
contrary to judicial policy, reaches an "absurd or unreasonable re-
sult." 37 Third, "delivery" as defined in the statutes requires a willful
act, unlike the passage of blood within an umbilical cord, which occurs
without the control or volition of the pregnant woman.1 38 Consequently,
this "delivery," which is not willful, fails to establish the requisite level of
intent under the drug trafficking statutes.1 39 Neither can this "delivery"
135. Appellant's Initial Brief at 22, Johnson (No. 89-1765) ("[Tihe State apparently neither
preserved nor tested a sample of the blood from either cord.").
136. See Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant at 21, People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich.
1991) (No. 128458). The brief argues:
mT1he legislature cannot be presumed to have acted so irrationally as to have made it a
felony for a woman to 'deliver' a cocaine metabolite through the umbilical cord, but to
have left untouched other conduct by both men and women that can more likely and
more seriously damage future offspring.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Appellant's Initial Brief at 35, Johnson (No. 89-1765), where the
defense similarly argued that the Florida statute was modeled after a federal drug law which in-
tended to deter drug trafficking by criminalizing participation in the manufacture and delivery of
controlled substances.
137. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 16, Johnson (No. 89-1765) (quoting Carawan v. State, 515
So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1987)). The Amici Curiae in the Hardy case rely on the same premise: "It is
axiomatic that 'statutes are to be construed so as to avoid absurd consequences.'" Brief of Ameri-
can Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations As Amici Curiae in support of
Defendant Appellant at 19, Hardy (No. 128458) (quoting King v. Director of the Midland Co. DSS,
251 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich. App. 1977)).
138. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant at 16, Hardy (No. 128458); Appellant's Initial
Brief at 35, Johnson (No. 89-1765). The counter argument is that a woman engages in willful con-
duct when she ingests the cocaine, and this voluntary act fulfills the willful requirement for the drug
delivery statute. This argument was articulated in Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991): "Although the dissent refers to blood flow as an involuntary act, the placing of cocaine
into that blood flow is a voluntary act, and the cocaine destination is far more certain than if it were
placed into the United States Mail." Id. at 420 n.l.
139. Appellant's Initial Brief at 24-27, Johnson (No. 89-1765); Brief of American Public Health
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be deterred in the sense that the legislature meant to deter "delivery"
with the drug trafficking statutes."4 Thus, construing the passage of
blood between a woman and the fetus as a delivery of a drug, or drug
trafficking, distorts the statute in a manner which is biased against
women.
B. Constitutional Violations
The drug delivery strategy also has been attacked for infringing the
constitutional rights of defendants, including due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Eighth Amendment ban against punishing
status; and the constitutional right to privacy as interpreted under the
Association and Other Concerned Organizations as Amid Curiae in Support of Defendant Appel-
lant at 16, Hardy (No. 128458).
140. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 17, Johnson (No. 89-1765).
The attorneys for the defense in Hardy and Johnson articulated yet another reason why the pas-
sage of blood between a woman and a fetus is not "delivery" under a drug trafficking statute. Ac-
cording to the defense, a mother passes benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite, to the fetus. See, e.g.,
Appellant's Initial Brief at 8, Johnson (No. 89-1765). Benzoylecgonine is a derivative of cocaine
which does not contain any of its addictive nature. Appellant's Initial Brief at 17, Johnson (No. 89-
1765) ("The State's own witnesses established that benzoylecgonine 'is not an active ingredient,' and
therefore does not produce a 'rush' or other sensation ... [Another State witness] testified that
benzoylecgonine is an 'inactive metabolite, there is no action involved at all' ") (citations omitted);
see also Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as Amici
Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant at 18, Hardy (No. 128458) ("An inactive cocaine metabo-
lite is not an addictive substance, nor is it one of the substances which the legislature aimed to
regulate."). For the purposes of Florida law, a controlled substance is one that "has a high potential
for abuse... and abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence,"
FLA. STAT. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (Schedule II) (1990) (cited in Brief of American Public Health Associ-
ation and Other Concerned Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 14 n.20,
Johnson (No. 89-1765)). Thus, the passage of benzolecgonine to the fetus is not prohibited by the
Florida law. This is true under Michigan law as well. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 333.7214 (a)(iv)
(West 1980). In addition, the Florida drug trafficking statute was intended to deter the trafficking,
sale, delivery, and use of controlled substances, Appellant's Initial Brief at 15, Johnson (No. 89-
1765), and, as defense counsel in Johnson argues: "[B]enzoylecgonine, because it is hydrolyzed in the
human liver, could only conceivably be sold, purchased, manufactured, or delivered ... if dealers
were to market a cocaine user's blood or urine." Id. at 16. The defense counsel notes that the
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, § 893.03(2)(a) defines a controlled
substance as cocaine or a derivative of cocaine. Defense argues, however, that the statute refers to
such derivatives as crack, which "can be sold, passed from hand to hand, and transported through-
out the country" instead of a cocaine metabolite. Id. For these reasons, defense counsel in both the
Johnson and the Hardy cases argued the transfer of a cocaine metabolite through the blood of preg-
nant drug users to their fetuses cannot be prosecuted under drug delivery statutes. See Brief of
American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Defendant Appellant at 17, Hardy (No. 128458); see also Appellant's Initial Brief at 19,
Johnson (No. 89-1765) ("substances named in § 893.03(2)(a)(4) must be accorded a precise
definition.").
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liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
The due process argument in the drug "dealing" cases parallels the
due process argument against charging pregnant drug users under child
abuse and neglect laws: women charged with "dealing" drugs to their
fetus have been deprived of any warning that drug trafficking statutes
could encompass their behavior. The novel and unforeseeable applica-
tion of drug trafficking statutes violates pregnant drug users' constitu-
tional right to fair notice, and thus, due process. 142 As the defense
counsel argued in Johnson:
A woman of common intelligence could not know, based on the prosecu-
tion of adults who pass an illegal drug to a child of some years, that the
State views identically the transfer of an inactive cocaine metabolite
through the umbilical cord to a newborn still attached to the mother. The
application of § 893.13Q)(c)(1) to the facts of this case left Johnson without
fair warning that her conduct was punishable as delivery of drugs to a mi-
nor. "The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a crimi-
nal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
the contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 143
Two trial courts have accepted this due process argument as grounds for
dismissal of drug delivery charges." 4
Another constitutional argument courts have accepted when dis-
missing drug delivery charges is that the strategy violates the fundamen-
tal privacy rights of procreation and the right to autonomy in
reproductive decisionmaking.14s The Appellant's brief in Johnson sup-
ports this claim by the reasoning that there is virtually no rehabilitative
care available for poor pregnant women: "a woman, unable to get help
for her addiction, may be held criminally liable under 893.13(1)(c)(1)
simply for continuing her pregnancy and giving birth."'" Consequently,
141. The right to privacy as a right guaranteed under the Constitution was first articulated in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), when the Supreme Court decided that a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right of privacy of married people.
142. See, eg., Appellants Initial Brief at 38, Johnson (No. 89-1765).
143. Id. (citing Bonie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954))).
144. See Judge Drops Charge of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby, supra note 121: "'No
reasonable person would anticipate that the statute prohibited the behavior prosecuted here,' Judge
Eveland wrote in dismissing the felony charge against the woman, Lynn Bremer."; Commonwealth
v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. (Super. Ct. of Mass. Oct. 15, 1990), discussed in, Case Summary,
supra note 2, at 9.
145. The courts are two trial courts, one in Muskegon County, Michigan, and one in Plymouth
County, Massachusetts. See Judge Drops Charge of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby, supra note
121; Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. (Super. Ct. of Mass. Oct. 15, 1990), discussed
in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 9.
146. Appellant's Initial Brief at 42-43, Johnson (No. 89-1765): "Because a pregnant addict
19921
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a woman's reproductive choice to continue her pregnancy may be impli-
cated by a criminal charge which relies on the physical realities of preg-
nancy: the umbilical cord and the fetus.47 Since drug use and possession
is already a crime, the escalation of the crime to a drug trafficking viola-
tion based on defendant's pregnancy implicates a woman's right to bodily
integrity and reproductive decisionmaking. a8
Although an infringement of a fundamental right such as privacy
may be justified if the state has a compelling interest, 149 defense attorneys
and courts have not always perceived the state's compelling interest in a
viable child as overriding the defendant's privacy right.150 One rationale
is that there exists less intrusive means for the state to guard its compel-
ling interest, since the drug delivery strategy does not deter women from
this criminal conduct when there is a paucity of rehabilitative care for
pregnant addicts.15 As the Superior Court of Massachusetts stated:
The Commonwealth can develop an alternative means to effectuate its pur-
poses, one which does not interfere with a woman's right to privacy or de-
stroy the fundamental relationship between mother and her fetus, as this
prosecution threatens. The Commonwealth may effectuate its stated inter-
est in protecting viable fetuses through less restrictive means, such as edu-
cation and making available medical care and drug treatment centers for
pregnant women. 1
52
Thus, the privacy right of a pregnant woman may potentially defeat a
drug delivery charge.
One constitutional argument that has not been cited in trial court
rulings is the Eighth Amendment argument. 153 Amici briefs for defend-
ants submitted to courts of appeals in both the Hardy and the Johnson
would have to give up her right to procreate to avoid prosecution, this application of § 893.13
(1)(c)(1) must be strictly scrutinized." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 44.
149. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
150. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 7-8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 9; Judge Drops Charge of Delivering Drugs to an
Unborn Baby, supra note 121. But see State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 13, 1989), discussed in, Case Summary, supra note 2, at 5-6 (deciding in favor of the prosecution
with no mention of the defendant's privacy right.)
151. See. eg., Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970. slip op. at 8-9.
152. Id. at 8.
153. The decision in Commonwealth v. Pellegrini did not mention any violation of the Eighth
Amendment rights of the defendant. No. 87970, slip op. at 7-8. The judge in the case against Lynne
Bremer dismissed the drug delivery charges against her relying on intent, due process and privacy
grounds. Judge Drops Charges of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby, supra note 121. Therefore, it
was not clear whether the Eighth Amendment argument was made by defense counsel.
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cases argued for criminal statutes to comply with the Eighth Amend-
ment: the statutes must punish conduct, not status. 154 This argument
relies on the premise that, although a pregnant woman is guilty of the
possession and use of cocaine, these acts, which are the only acts qualify-
ing as conduct, do not constitute the "delivery" of the drug to the fe-
tus.155 Instead, the crime for which she is guilty is an involuntary bodily
response - the flow of blood which brings cocaine to the fetus. The
women are not being punished for their conduct of drug use or posses-
sion, but for the reality of being pregnant and addicted, for
the physiological reality [is] that unless a pregnant addict decides to abort
or is somehow cured of her addiction, she will inevitably deliver a baby
while she remains an addict. To punish her for that delivery is, therefore,
to punish her for her combined status as a pregnant woman and a drug
addict. 156
Amici in Hardy also argued that the immutable characteristic of preg-
nancy, that of a physiological connection with a fetus, is also a violation
of equal protection under the law, because it subjects the actions of preg-
nant women to far greater punishment than the actions of men.
15 7
However, neither the Hardy nor the Johnson court explicitly ad-
dressed any of the constitutional issues in their opinions.'5 8 In Hardy,
the court emphasized that penal statutes should be strictly construed ac-
cording to legislative intent, and that the court was not at liberty to cre-
ate a crime by applying the drug trafficking statute to the birthing
process.' 5 9 This approach respects the pregnant drug user's due process
rights by not depriving them of fair notice. The Johnson court skirted
the issue altogether, while imputing knowledge to the defendant:
154. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant at 30, Hardy (No. 128458); Brief of American
Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Ap-
pellant at 26, Johnson (No. 89-1765). The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment which Amici contend occurs when one is punished for status, rather than for prohibited
conduct. Id.
155. See sources cited supra note 154.
156. Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant at 31-32, Hardy (No. 128458).
157. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief from the National Association for Per-
inatal Addiction Research and Education on behalf of Jennifer Johnson at 34, Johnson (No. 89-
1765). The brief cited certain behaviors of men that can endanger fetuses, yet are not examined by
courts or legislators; thus, the ability of women to get pregnant can subject women to greater penal-
ties than men. Id.
158. People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
159. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50.
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Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it would pass to
her fetus and knowing (or should have known) that birth was imminent.
She is deemed to know that an infant at birth is a person, and a minor, and
that delivery of cocaine to the infant is illegal. We can reach no other con-
clusion logically. 16
Arguably, the Johnson court's emphasis on the defendant's knowledge
does address the fair notice and due process arguments by rendering
them inapplicable. Both the dissent in Johnson and the majority and
concurring opinions in Hardy acknowledged the complex policy issues
posed by maternal substance abuse, and because of the complexity of the
problem and the problems with applying existing statutes, recommended
that the legislature try to resolve the problem.1 61
In one sense, state legislatures are a more appropriate forum in
which to resolve the problems of drug exposed newborns and maternal
drug abuse, since laws aimed specifically at pregnant drug users and drug
exposed infants would avoid the constitutional violations of women's
rights by providing notice. Recently, five states have amended their stat-
utory definitions of abused or neglected children to include infants born
addicted to drugs or alcohol as a result of the prenatal conduct of their
mothers. 62 In addition, many states have passed or are considering leg-
islation which would explicitly criminalize drug use and alcohol abuse by
pregnant women.1 63  However, these laws, while arguably eliminating
constitutional issues by providing notice, 1" perpetuate the underlying
problem with these prosecutions: subjecting women to disproportionate
punishment because of their biological connection to their fetuses.
Although ostensibly passed with the intention to protect newborns and
160. Johnson, 578 So.2d at 420.
161. Johnson, 578 So.2d at 427 (Sharp, J., dissenting); Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 53, 55.
162. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-
03(c) (Smith Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (Bums 1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 432B.330(1)(b) (Michie 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West 1989).
163. According to an ACLU Memo by Kary Moss, Gene Guerrero, and Kitty Kolbert, entitled
Legislative Update on Drug Use During Pregnancy (Sept. 16, 1991), legislative efforts were made to:
amend the definition of child neglect in civil actions to include prenatal drug or alcohol use in nine
states (Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
South Carolina); subject drug dependant women to additional criminal penalties for using drugs
during pregnancy in seven states (Massachusetts, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, New York, Rhode Island
and Texas); require health care providers to test pregnant women and counsel them about the fetal
effects of drugs, alcohol and tobacco, or report or commit patients who use drugs in five states
(Idaho, Illinois, Oregon, Michigan and Montana).
164. But see James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment
for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1104 (1991); Doretta M. McGinnis, Comment,
Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-exposed Babies Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 505 (1990).
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pregnant drug users, these laws still allow women's biological difference
to be a means by which women receive unequal treatment under the law.
The problem posed by these laws is really one inherent in the politics of
pregnancy.
III. THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY:
BREAKING DowN DICHOTOMIES
The drug delivery strategy is problematic not only because it is pre-
mised on biased statutory construction and violates the Constitution, as
articulated in Part II, but because the strategy perpetuates discrimina-
tory treatment against pregnant women. Part I of this Note introduced
the concepts of separation and connection as a means of analysis for the
maternal-fetal relationship, and showed how the emergence of increased
legal status for the fetus was premised on identifying the woman and
fetus as two distinct entities. A theme throughout this Note has been
that once the maternal-fetal relationship is perceived as a relationship
between two people (mother and child), the two people can become ad-
versaries, and the "mother" can be construed as the drug dealer, with the
"child" construed as the victim. This Note has argued that defining a
maternal drug user's conduct as delivering drugs to her child results in
unequal treatment for women.
.Part III argues that a fundamental problem in reaching equality for
women is the legal definition and treatment of pregnancy. Although the
status of women is a powerful tool in determining how women are
treated while pregnant, it may be possible to elevate women's status by
redefining pregnancy and its legal consequences. Both Section A and
Section B discuss the interrelationship of women's status and the legal
treatment of pregnancy. Section A argues that the choices of separation
or connection as a means of defining the maternal-fetal relationship are
inadequate because both notions depend on the existence of the fetus, and
thus both choices fail to consider the woman as an entity unto herself.
Section B discusses another mode of analysis for pregnancy - the equal
treatment versus special treatment debate concerning the treatment of
pregnant women in the workplace. When confronting discrimination
against pregnant workers, courts and commentators have debated
whether these workers should be treated as if they are not pregnant (or,
"equal" to men), or as if the realities of the workers' pregnancies should
be accommodated (and treated "special," or different, from men). Here
too, the legal treatment of pregnancy is defined by the existence of an-
other - a man. Section B argues that the dichotomy of equal versus
1992]
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special treatment implicitly informs the legal treatment of maternal drug
use and will impede resolution of the problem unless both approaches are
incorporated. In sum, Part III suggests that when the courts and society
have developed a means of defining a pregnant woman as a completely
independent entity, instead of defining her in relation to a fetus or a man,
one obstacle in reaching complete equality lor all women be reached.
A. The Maternal-Fetal Relationship: Breaking Down Dichotomies
Women's status in the gender hierarchy both affects and is affected
by the definition of the maternal-fetal relationship. If the woman and the
fetus are perceived as connected, and the fetus is part of the woman's
body, then the woman has autonomy and decision-making control.
However, if the woman and the fetus are perceived as separate entities,
and the fetus has an independent existence, then the woman's rights can
be subordinated to those of the fetus. Fetal rights advocates, by asserting
that a fetus has rights independent of the mother, either implicitly or
explicitly rely on the notion that the woman and the fetus are separate.
In the context of maternal drug abuse, feminists have argued that
the increasing criminalization of pregnant women's behavior stems from
an emphasis on separation, which has been labeled a rights-oriented per-
ception of the maternal-fetal relationship. 65 That is, prosecuting women
for fetal abuse or child abuse/neglect for drug use while pregnant relies
on the premise that the woman and the fetus are separate entities. The
court's analysis of pregnant women's conduct necessarily focuses on
whether the statute in question applies, which often translates into
whether the fetus qualifies as a child. Defining the fetus as a child over-
looks the physiological connection between the woman and the fetus, and
imposes a rights oriented analysis by perceiving the woman and the fetus
both as individuals with separate and potentially conflicting rights. 166
The rights oriented analysis has been criticized as formalistic and infused
with notions common to patriarchy: separation instead of connection,
and autonomy instead of interdependence.1 67
A preferable perception of a woman and a fetus, it has been argued,
relies on those notions of connection and interdependence. 168 These no-
tions reflect an alternative and feminist world-view, because they stem
both from women's ways of perceiving society and relationships, as well
165. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 15, at 1325-26.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1335-39. See also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
168. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 15, at 1341-43.
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as women's experience of the physical relationship in pregnancy. 169
Remedies for the situation of maternal drug use that reflect interdepen-
dence and connection between a woman and the fetus would acknowl-
edge their mutual needs, such as available, comprehensive prenatal care
and drug treatment programs tailored for pregnant women who may also
need daycare.
These alternative views of the maternal-fetal relationship have re-
suited in a dichotomy for analyzing the legal approach to maternal drug
use: connection versus separation. Either the fetus is connected to the
woman, and the same as she; or the fetus is separate from the woman,
and different from she. Ironically, the drug delivery strategy used to
prosecute pregnant drug users reflects the complexity of defining the ma-
ternal-fetal relationship. The strategy depends on the notion that the
mother and the fetus are separate entities (in fact, for the purposes of the
strategy, the fetus is defined as a minor); as well as relying on the physi-
cal connection of pregnancy, the umbilical cord, as the means of "deliv-
ery." It is difficult to determine which aspect of pregnancy is more
important for the success of the drug delivery strategy - connection or
separation. Arguably this is because both are just as important.
Using the dichotomy of separation or connection when defining the
rights of a pregnant woman is ultimately a disservice to the woman. It
defines her in relation to her fetus; either she is connected to it, and their
identities merge, or she is separate from it, and two entities exist with
separate and potentially conflicting rights. Because a woman's identity is
defined according to the existence of a fetus, so then do her rights become
relative, that is, defined and weighed relative to the rights of the fetus.
Her rights do not exist in her alone, but only as they pertain to the fetus.
In a sense, then, she does not completely possess her rights. Her legal
identity is not wholly independent, because her interests cannot be con-
ceptualized independently. This lack of independence allows discrimina-
tory treatment against her, in the name of the fetus. To some extent, this
lack of a complete identity for pregnant women affects how we view wo-
men in general. Women are either pregnant or non-pregnant, they are
not simply women in the way men are simply men.
The dichotomy is also inaccurate because it perpetuates the idea
that protection can be accorded a fetus separately without affecting the
169. This alternate view is more fully explored in Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note
15. The author refers to various works by feminists which have developed alternatives to patriarchal
structures. See, eg., GILLIGAN, supra note 167; MARY F. BELENKY ET AL, WOMEN'S WAYS OF
KNOWING (1986).
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mother. When a woman is pregnant, whatever "rights" a fetus suppos-
edly merits can only be enforced through the pregnant woman -
through her body and her rights. Thus, the physiological reality of preg-
nancy, connection, is never actually absent from the conceptualization of
the maternal-fetal relationship. The fetal abuse laws illustrate the prob-
lem with the separation versus connection dichotomy. The laws rely on
the notion that the fetus is a separate legal entity, yet the only means of
protecting this entity is by regulating the pregnant woman's behavior.
While the dichotomy allows only two definitions of the maternal-fetal
relationship, either separation or connection, in reality the definitions
overlap. The maternal-fetal relationship is complex because a woman is
both separate and connected to her fetus, and because the individualistic
and rights based legal system cannot accommodate overlapping
categories. 170
The separation versus connection analysis implies that women will
have more autonomy and rights if their fetus is not viewed as a separate
entity. However, in reality, the balance of power in the maternal-fetal
relationship is controlled by the status of women. 1 The apparent develop-
ment of power or rights of the fetus does not occur in a vacuum, or
necessarily because of societal concern for children, but because women's
status in society accords women insufficient autonomy, power and rights.
For example, a disproportionate number of women of color are prose-
cuted under the drug delivery strategy, as well as under other child
abuse/neglect provisions. 171 The lower the status of women in general,
or women of color in particular, the greater the likelihood of discrimina-
tory treatment in the name of the fetus. Thus, women's status deter-
mines the balance of power between woman and fetus. A danger of the
drug delivery strategy is that it appears to rely solely on the separate
existence of the fetus, therefore obscuring the larger context in which the
drug delivery strategy occurs - the reality of social hierarchy and gen-
der inequality.
B. Pregnancy: Defining Equal Treatment
Pregnancy, perhaps one of the most dramatic examples of gender
difference, has consistently been a problematic issue in the struggle for
gender equality. The gender equality debate has focused on one principal
means of analysis: equal treatment versus special treatment. The equal
170. See, eg., Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the
Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990).
171. See Roberts, supra note 15.
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treatment approach is premised on the sameness of the sexes, while the
special treatment approach relies upon the differences between the sexes.
Defining a legal approach to maternal drug use is difficult because the
issue poses the same problem: should pregnant drug users be treated the
same as or different from other drug users?
Courts and feminist commentators have engaged in the special treat-
ment versus equal treatment debate when analyzing issues relating to
pregnancy in the workplace. 172  Often the question becomes whether
pregnant women should be treated as if they are not pregnant (i.e., as
men would be treated), or whether they should receive special treatment
for the incidents of their pregnancy. The Supreme Court has grappled
with cases which illustrate the political effect of providing pregnant wo-
men with equal treatment as opposed to special treatment. A brief re-
view of the Court's decisions defines the equal versus special treatment
debate.
The decisions of the Court in Geduldig v. Aeilo, 173 General Electric
v. Gilbert,74 and United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls,171 illustrate
an application of the equal treatment approach. In Geduldig, the Court
held that a California insurance system which did not provide for preg-
nancy or pregnancy related disabilities did not invidiously discriminate
against women, and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 176
This is an example of "equal" treatment, where every participant in the
insurance program receives the same benefits - thus the insurance
scheme appears "equal." Similarly, in General Electric v. Gilbert,177 the
plaintiffs challenged an insurance policy, which, as in Geduldig, excluded
pregnancy and related conditions from coverage under Title VII. 7 s The
Court admitted that pregnancy is confined to women, yet insisted that
172. For definitive works on the equal treatment/special treatment debate, see Wendy W. Wil-
liams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986). See also
DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 117 (1989).
173. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
174. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
175. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
176. The core of the Court's reasoning revolved around the notion that excluding pregnancy
and pregnancy related conditions was not gender related. The oft-quoted statement of Justice Stew-
art illustrates this reasoning: "The program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons." Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
177. 429 U.S. 125.
178. Id. at 127-28.
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women were not being discriminated against because of their gender. 179
The Court's analysis reflects the idea that equal treatment is gender neu-
tral, and therefore results in equality. However, the Court's equal treat-
ment standard is not gender neutral; it is gender specific. Pregnancy is
perceived as something "extra" only because it is compared to male
physiology. 180 The result of the Court's reasoning and the "male" stan-
dard is in reality unequal treatment for women. Although both cases
were effectively overruled by an amendment to Title VII entitled the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 181 their reasoning nonetheless illustrates
the problem inherent in "equal" treatment for women: "equal" treatment
is a means that does not necessarily result in equality.
A somewhat more positive result of the Court's equal treatment ap-
proach was the Johnson Controls '2 case. In Johnson Controls, the plain-
tiffs challenged the employer's enactment of a fetal protection policy
which prohibited fertile women from working in areas that would subject
them to high lead exposure.'83 The policy effectively denied women ac-
cess to many of the jobs at the workplace, with the justification that the
high lead exposure would damage potential offspring.' The Court held
that the fetal protection policy violated Title VII because it classified
workers with regard to pregnancy, which was essentially classifying them
according to sex.'8 5 In this situation, the Court's decision to adopt the
equal treatment approach allowed women "equal" access to the work-
place. However, the final result is that women are allowed to work in a
toxic workplace - a result still hard to celebrate. In fact, this "equal"
access to the workplace is not really equal at all, because only women,
not men, must sacrifice healthy reproductive systems when they work at
the plant. 8 ' Thus, equal access to the workplace does not translate effec-
tively to gender equality.
179. Id. at 136.
180. See, eg., Rhode, supra note 172, at 119.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k). The Act amended Title VII to provide that "women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same... as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." The Act does not require the imple-
mentation of a maternity leave program or other benefits related to pregnancy where there is no
corollary benefits provided for other disabilities.
182. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
183. Id. at 1200.
184. Id. at 1205.
185. Id. at 1209.
186. There is some evidence that high lead exposure also harms the reproductive systems of
men, although the evidence is not nearly as conclusive as that indicating the danger of high lead
exposure to women. Id. at 1203. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959 (1978) ("Exposure to lead has pro-
foundly adverse effects on the course of reproduction in both males and females.").
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One of the Supreme Court cases where the Court has allowed differ-
ent treatment to be accorded pregnant women is California Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association v. Guerra.i"7 In CaL Fed., a California statute
mandated that employers reinstate workers after maternity leave was
challenged on the basis of its potential preemption by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act (PDA).188 The plaintiffs argued that since the PDA
prohibited discrimination based on pregnancy, a state statute that pro-
vided better benefits for pregnant workers effectively violated the
PDA.'89 The Court disagreed, holding that the PDA created a floor, not
a ceiling with regard to the benefits that could be accorded pregnant wo-
men. 190 Thus, in this instance, the Court allowed "special treatment" for
women, because women were allowed to retain a guarantee to "extra"
benefits under the state maternity leave policy. The special treatment
approach acknowledges the reality of pregnancy in a way that "equal"
treatment does not. Special treatment in the form of providing support
services for the pregnant woman can benefit both the woman and the
fetus.
Implicit in both the special treatment and the equal treatment ap-
proach is the need for a standard. Being treated the "same as" or "differ-
ent from" means being treated the same as something or different from
something. As Catherine MacKinnon points out, this standard is not
neutral, nor does it exist in a political vacuum; instead, the standard is a
male standard which orients the debate according to the gender hierar-
chy. 191 When acknowledgement of the physical reality of pregnancy is
defined as "different" or "special," the implied standard that pregnancy
is being compared to is the physical reality of being a male. When a
pregnant woman is accorded "equal" treatment, she is accorded the same
treatment as a male. This is appealing to our conception of equality,
which is premised on the idea that everyone should be treated the same
- no one is discriminated against, and no one is privileged. However,
this notion defies reality by failing to account for the fact that men and
women are not the same and have different needs. So, although the ques-
tion of treating the sexes the same as or different from each other appears
politically neutral, in actuality, the debate defines the question as
187. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
188. Id. at 274-75.
189. Id. at 278-79.
190. Id. at 280 (citing the Court of Appeals, 758 F. 2d 390, 395 (1985)).
191. See generally CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987) (postu-
lating that the sameness/difference debate is defined by the gender hierarchy and as such is limited in
the reform it can accomplish).
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whether to treat women the same as men or different from men. The
sameness/difference focus ignores the broader context of gender inequal-
ity and social hierarchy by portraying gender difference as the reason
that women are treated unequally, which obscures the fact that gender
difference is a problem because of gender inequality.1 9z
The drug delivery strategy exploits gender difference by relying on
the physiological realities of pregnancy, mainly the umbilical cord, in
order to construct a crime that pregnant women have committed. Thus,
the sameness/difference dichotomy, while not explicitly referred to in the
discussion of how to resolve the problem of maternal drug use, informs
the legal approach to the problem. Constructing a crime based on wo-
men's physiological differences consists of special treatment for women,
as do the criminal and civil charges of child abuse/neglect, and the fetal
abuse laws. These punishments constitute special treatment because they
are tailor-made for women: they are premised on the biological reality of
pregnancy, and subject women to a crime for which only they can be
guilty.
The alternatives to this form of special treatment for pregnant wo-
men that have been articulated also can be categorized as either equal or
special treatment. Equal treatment, or gender neutral treatment, is pros-
ecuting a woman for drug use or drug possession, the same punishment
accorded a man. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has advo-
cated this approach as a means to achieve more just treatment for preg-
nant women who use drugs. 193 However, this approach overlooks the
context of drug prosecutions and the pervasiveness of discrimination
against women. Even if pregnant women are prosecuted only for drug
use or drug possession, because of women's status and the constant scru-
tiny they are under while pregnant, they will be the object of dispropor-
tionate prosecutorial zeal, resulting in more women than men being
prosecuted for the same crime.194 In addition, many hospitals test
newborns for drug exposure, and if a newborn tests positive, the police
can then use this information to bring charges of drug use against the
mother.1 95 The testing of newborns for drug exposure provides a special
mechanism for discovering and prosecuting maternal drug use.
192. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990).
193. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 44 (" 'Arrest pregnant women for possession or use, the
same thing you'd arrest a man for,' says Lynn Paltrow of the ACLU.").
194. See Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutor" Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prose-
cution of Drug Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 737 (1991).
195. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 14, at 35, 44.
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Another remedy advocated by the ACLU and other commentators
is increased supportive services for women who use drugs while preg-
nant.19 This remedy would fall into the special treatment category, as it
provides women with "extra" services solely because of their pregnancy,
those which a man would not need. As explained above, special treat-
ment acknowledges the reality of women's pregnancy, by providing for
the needs resulting from pregnancy. Supportive services would consist of
more comprehensive and accessible prenatal care, and drug treatment
programs tailored specifically for pregnant women. Currently, the
United States has no comprehensive prenatal care program that is acces-
sible to all women, 197 as evidenced by the inordinately high rate of infant
mortality and low birth weight in this country. 198 Even if a pregnant
drug user had access to prenatal care, she probably could not find appro-
priate services which would help her counter her drug addiction, because
there is almost a complete lack of rehabilitative drug centers which are
open to pregnant women.1 99 Most drug rehabilitative centers were
designed for male heroin addicts, and consequently do not have obstetri-
cians on staff."° Even clinics which do admit pregnant drug addicts al-
most never have child care facilities, which effectively bars many
pregnant drug users who already have children from using the clinic.2"'
196. See, eg., Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(No. 89-1765); Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant Appellant, People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1991)
(No. 128458); Moss, supra note 81.
197. An extensive nationwide study by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that about
63% of the women studied received inadequate prenatal care which began late and generally did not
meet the recognized minimal standards. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRENATAL CARE:
MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND UNINSURED WOMEN OBTAIN INSUFFICIENT CARE 3 (1987).
198. In 1985, the U.S. infant mortality rate placed nineteenth in the world. The U.S. Black
infant mortality rate is twenty-eighth, behind Cuba and Bulgaria, and equal to Costa Rica. AMERI-
CAN HEALTH LAW 924 (George Annas et. al. eds., 1990). In that same year, the U.S. experienced
an increase in the proportion of infants born with low birthweight, the proportion born prematurely,
and the proportion born with no prenatal care. Id. at 925. Low birth weight accounts for 2/3 of all
infant deaths; low birth weight is widely recognized as the primary factor of the high U.S. infant
mortality rate, and could be drastically cut by early and comprehensive prenatal care. National
Health Law Program - Cost Effectiveness of Prenatal Care, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 259, 260
(1985).
199. According to a much cited New York City survey, 87% of New York City's drug abuse
programs turned away pregnant crack addicts. Wendy Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail Addicted Mother,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1989, at A21. According to Hoffman, supra note 14, at 44, "[v]ery few pro-
grams nationwide accept pregnant addicts, largely because of liability problems posed by high-risk
pregnancies."
200. Lacayo, supra note 14, at 23.
201. Chavkin, supra note 191.
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In addition, lack of insurance is a barrier to poor women; even if preg-
nant women receive Medicaid, only seventeen days of a typical twenty-
eight day treatment are covered, which is usually not adequate to fully
treat their addiction.2 "2 Special treatment in the form of increased sup-
portive services for pregnant drug users is thus necessary to acknowledge
and accommodate the reality of pregnancy and drug use.
The categories of special treatment and equal treatment start to
blur, as advocates for women's equality argue for both. If the approach
to resolving the problem of maternal drug use was completely con-
strained by the sameness/difference approach, then the potential solu-
tions would be posed as being available in isolation. This approach
would mean either special treatment or equal treatment, which would
translate into both supportive services and prosecution for specially con-
structed crimes (special treatment), or no supportive services and prose-
cution for the gender neutral crimes of drug use and possession. Instead,
both equal treatment in the form of prosecutions solely for drug use and
special treatment in the form of supportive services is and should be
advocated.
Attempts to dissolve the sameness/difference debate and to develop
an alternative approach to reach gender equality have a common theme:
dissolving the dichotomous analysis and formulating practical strategies
that accommodate both women's sameness and women's difference.20 3
Successfully accomplishing these goals requires defining how women's
differences should be considered in varying contexts. 21 Women's differ-
ence as it pertains to pregnancy needs to be the basis for accomodation
with supportive services. For "special" treatment in the form of support-
ive services to lead to equality, these services must recognize and ac-
comodate the needs arising from both pregnancy and drug use. So, in
the context of accomodation of women's pregnancy, their "difference"
and their different needs should be recognized. Yet, the physiological
reality of women's pregnancy - the umbilical cord and the transfer of
blood between woman and fetus - should not be the basis of specially
constructed crimes. Laws specifically tailored to pregnant drug users
and drug exposed infants consist of specially constructed crimes, and rec-
ognize women's difference solely in order to prosecute her. Thus, in the
202. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 44.
203. See, eg., Joan Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and CriticalRace Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296 (1991); Linda Hass-
berg, Note, Toward Gender Equality: Testing a Broader Discrimination Standard in the Workplace,
40 BUFF. L. REv. 217 (1991); RHODE, supra note 172, at 123.
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context of civil or criminal penalties, women should be accorded "equal"
treatment in the form of charges of drug use or possession, not charges of
drug trafficking or child abuse. Although this form of "equal" treat-
ment is problematic because women may still be subject to a greater rate
and degree of punishment for the reasons noted above, women should be
subject to the same laws as others. One method to prevent women from
receiving disproportionate punishment is to prohibit the testing of their
newborns or their umbilical cords for cocaine, since doing so takes ad-
vantage of the physiological realities of their pregnancy solely in order to
punish them.
The attempt to go beyond the dichotomy of special versus equal
treatment and utilizing both classes of treatment, while helpful, does not
solve the problem of maternal drug use. Offering supportive services,
such as prenatal and rehabilitative care, does not necessarily mean that
those who need the services will use them. Deterrence from drug use is
not necessarily accomplished for anyone, or specifically for pregnant
drug users, through laws against drug use and possession. These
problems are inherent in all aspects of our social system - people fail to
use the services that can help them, and fail to refrain from illegal con-
duct simply because it is illegal. Approaching the problem of maternal
drug use through both special and equal treatment, however imperfect
each of those options may be, is nonetheless the most equitable and prac-
tical approach. Creative punishments which exploit women's difference
only furthers gender inequality by using women's physiological difference
as a means by which to subjugate them.
CONCLUSION
Defining pregnancy is not an easy task - it involves breaking down
ingrained dichotomies of woman versus fetus, separation versus connec-
tion, and sameness versus difference. As long as we are building on these
dichotomies by prosecuting pregnant drug users for drug delivery to mi-
nors, a fair definition of pregnancy will continue to elude us. A woman's
pregnancy is currently a means to view women in relation to their fetuses
and evaluate their rights as compared to a man's. Although the gender
hierarchy necessarily informs treatment of pregnant women, pregnancy
has become one of the primary vehicles for endowing women with a rela-
tional identity and defining her rights relative to those of a fetus or a
man. Pregnancy may be an important part of a woman's experience, but
it should not be the means by which women and women's rights are
defined. Only when we can define a pregnant woman in the context of
1992]
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her womanhood, instead of the context of her pregnancy, will gender
equality be reached.
